I embraced now than it was three decades ago. Moreover, it is more widely accepted that inflation is subject to long-run control by the central hank. In recent years, the central banks of the United Kingdom, New Zealand and Canada have placed increased emphasis on reducing their long-run inflation rates. In the United States, former Nevertheless, considerable opposition reanains to making price stability the overriding objective of U.S. monetary policy Some argtte that the benefits of price stability do not warrant the cost of achieving it, For example, although extolling the virtues of price stability, Howitt (1990) is uncertain whether the benefits are worth the costs in terms of lost output (temporary and perhaps permanent, due to hysteresis effects).
Although we are skeptical whether the empirical and theoretical analyses to date have correctly identified all of the benefits of price stability, this article addresses an issue that is logically prior to this one. Specifically it addresses the question: If the inflation rate were zero, could society benefit from a higher rate of inflation? In other words, is moderate inflation preferable to price stability? Several arguments have been advanced that the economy benefits from moderate inflation. Recently DeLong and Summers (1992) and Summers (1991) have suggested several rationales for why a central bank would choose moderate inflation over price stability as its long-run policy goal.
This article addresses four reasons that have been suggested to prefer moderate to zero inflation:
1. Moderate inflation enhances the stability of the economy 2. Moderate inflation results in a higher steady-state level of output per person. 3. Moderate inflation increases the efficiency of inter-industry labor market adjustments. 4. Inflation enhances the efficacy of countercyclical monetary policy by allowing the real rate of interest to be negative, thereby stimulating effective demand in periods of recession.
The first two of these arguments are wellknown to economists, hut have received scant attention in public debates, Moreover, they are framed within specific, although quite different, theoretical models, so it is possihle to provide a rather definitive evaluation of their merit. The remaining two arguments have received considerable aatention, and may playa role in any public pohcy debate regarding the desirability of making price stability the primary monetary policy objective. The conceptual frameworks for these arguments are not well-specified, however, so we try to shore up their analytical footing hy proposing specific interpretations.
Before proceeding, several issues should he clarified, First, the hypotheses that there are economic benefits from moderate inflation considered here iunplicitly argue against a so-called Friedman Rule (Friedman, 1969) , that is, the "optimal" rate of money growth is one that generates steady-state deflation. Nevertheless, this article is not specifically about the Friedman Rule. Analyses of a Friedman Rule generally have been carried out in well-specified model economies.
Second, although the last two arguments for moderate inflation lack explicit theoreri-cal foundations, this has not prevented them from achieving an intellectual status among some economists and policymakers. The lack of theoretical foundations forces our analysis to range from the fairly technical to the somewhat conjectural, so that we may not provide a definitive evaluation of these arguments. In this case, we are content to present an analysis of these arguments.
Third, the arguments for moderate inflation analyzed here are hased on the assumptiorn of a fully anticipated, steady-state inflation. Although such inflations do nor characterize real-world econotnies. we make this assumption until it is relaxed when we discuss the reasons why price stability is preferable to moderate inflation.
Fourth, the phrase "moderate inflation" is not well-defined. Some might consider moderate inflation to he 2 to 3 percent. For others, any rate under 5 percent could he moderate. Still others may deem anything less than double-digit inflation moderate. We suggest 5 percent as the break point for moderate inflation in the United States.
Finally although we used the phrases price stability and zero inflation interchangeably we are aware that price stability is different and more stringent than zero inflation. Price stability implies that jumps in the price level are reversed; zero inflation need not.
THE CASE FOR MODERATẼ N FIATlION

Is Stability ofthe Economy Erhanctid by Moderate I'nflation?
The first argument for moderate inflation is that certain stability conditions are sturdier at a high-money (nominal) rate of interest, making the economy less vulnerable to various shocks. Understanding this argument requires an understanding of the notion of stability upon which it rests. To illustrate, suppose that the real rate of interest suddenly rises, say because of an increase in expected future profits. Given the underlying rare of inflation, this raises the money rate of interest, reducing the quantity of real money balances that individuals desire to hold, As individuals attempt to reduce their FEDERAL RESERVE holdings of real balances, prices rise still further, fueling expectations of further inflation. This reduces the quantity of real balances demanded still further, giving tise to a further increase in prices and so cm, The quesnion is: Under what conditions will this sequence converge?
i'he answer is: Self-generating inflation cannot occur if, as the price level rises, its rate of change declines, Holding the growth of the money supply constant, thLs condition is illustrated in Figure 1 , which shows two plots of the change in the log of the price level, against the price level itself, P. In one case, the slope of the curve rises with P. In this instance, the sequence will not converge and the ultimate solution is the trivial one; the demand for real money balances approaches zero, In the other case, the slope of the curve decreases as P increases, so that the sequence converges to a steady rate of inflation.
The argument that inflation enhances economic stability is an argument about the demand for money To see this argument, assume that the demand for real money balances is solely a function of the nominal interest rate, whereby the nominal interest rare equals the constant real interest rate plus the actual rate of inflation (which is fully anticipated). Cagan (1956) showed that the rate of inflation decreases as the price level rises if a~< 1. The parameter a is the semi-log slope of the demand for real money balances with respect to the nominal interest rate, that is, percent change in the demand for real money balances per percentage point change in the money interest rate (d ln(M/P)Idi). The parameter/I is the rate at which individuals revise their expectations of inflation under adaptive expectations, dE/dt PUr-F), where mrand Fare the actual and expected rates of inflation, respectively.
If a/I < I and the expected rate of inflation is initially greater than the actual rate, expected inflation falls until a stable steady state is reached at which the expected rate of inflation is equal to the actual rate, If, however, a/I is greater than unity and actual inflation is initially greater than expected inflation, both expected and actual inflation grow without limit with real balances falling.
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itiuruza Log of the Price Level Vs. Actual Price Level log P On the other hand, if a/I> I and actual is initially less than expected inflation, both actual and expected inflation fall without limit. The steady state at which the actual and expected rate are equal is unstable.
Stability Through Maderale Infiatian
If a and p are constants, the stability conditions will he invariant to the steadystate inflation rate. Consequently, the suggestion that the stability conditions are sturdier at non-zero rates of inflation is an argument that either a or /I is inversely related to the steady-state inflation rate. Specifically it was argued that a should be smaller at higher rates of money interest. That this maybe so conmes from noting that the elasticity of the demand for real mnone)' balances with respect to the money interest rates, e,,,, is equal to at, where i is the money interest rate. Thus, if e is constant, a will dechne as the rate of inflation and, hence, the money interest rate rises] All other things the same, the stability condition is more likely to be satisfied at higher rather than lower rates of nnoney interest if the interest elasticity demand for real money balances is constant.
The widely used Cagan (1956) moneydemand function assunnes that a is independent of the nominal interest rare. Cagan's function significantly underpredicted real money balances during periods \vhen prices were or had been relatively constant, hut performed \vcll during periods of high inf Lation.c This suggests that the underprediction was due to a being higher at low rates of inflation.
That a is inversely related to the steadystate inflation rate is plausible, hut this does not imply that stability is more likely at higher rates of inflation, For example, it is plausible that individuals revise their expectations of inflation more rapidly at higher rates of inflation, that is, that /I is positively related to the inflation rate. Indeed, Bruno (1989) provides some empirical support for a positive association between /I and the rate of inflation. Consequently it is not necessarily the case that stability is greater at high inflation rates, An inflation-induced fall in a might he just offset, or perhaps more than offset, by an inflation-induced rise in /3.
Using adaptive expectations, no general conclusion can be reached about the stability conditions and the steady-state inflation rate.
Getting an the Wrong Side af the La.fter Curve Bruno and Fischer (1990) have revisited Cagan's stability condition irm the context of financing a given budget deficit solely through seigniorage from cnoney creation. Although assuming that the deficit is financed solely through money creation is not realistic in developed economies like the United States, where other forms of taxation are available, the Bruno and Fischer assumption is a useful theoretical device which allows stability conditions to he anchored by two equilibria on either side of the Laffer curve. The Laffer curve is the recognition that tax receipts do not increase continuously with the tax rate. Beyond soene point, receipts decline as a further increase ira the tax rate results in a significant erosion of the tax base. Cormsequentlv except at that unique tax rate where tax revenue is nnaxinmized. there are two alternative tax rates and tax bases that generate the same tax revenue: a low tax i-ate and a high tax base, or a high tax rate and a low tax base. Bruno and Fischer demonstrate that if cr/I < I, a stahle equilibrium is at the socially desirable low tax rate-high tax base point. If a/I> 1, an equilibrium is at the socially undesirable 
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point on the Laffer curve. Consequently the argument is not whether the system is stable or explosive, but whether equilibrium is achieved at a socially desirable point on the Laffer curve.
What If Expectations .Are Rational?
From the condition that F = ir, it is easy to see that rational expectations are the limiting case of adaptive expectations. Adaptive expectations approach rational expectations as /3 -y x, Consequently if expectations are rational, the condition a/I < 1 cannot he satisfied for any value of a. in Cagan's world, the system explodes. In the Bruno and Fischer world of a fixed real deficit, a stable equilibrium (if it exists) is achieved at a high inflation rate on the wrong side of the Laffer curve, Under rational expectations, any affect on a is cotnpletely overwhelmed by /3, which is infinite.
It appears that nothing remains of the argument for stability through inflation, In the case of adaptive expectations, any possible reduction in a due to inflation may be offset by an increase in /3. If expectations are rational, an infinite /3 swamps any effect of inflation on a. Indeed, the stable equilibrium is at the socially undesirable side of the Lafier curve, that is, at a high rate of inflation (tax rate) and a low level of real cash balances (tax base). In particular, no argument can be made that moderate inflation produces stability on the socially desirable side of the Laffer curve.
Does Moderate inflaiian Lead to a Higher Level of Output?
The second argument for moderate inflation, that it leads to a higher level of steadystate output and consumption, was first formulated by Tohin (1965) . The essence of Tobin's model is that in a growing economy non-interest hearing real nmoney balances augment disposable income, Given that the propensity to save out of disposable inconae is less than unity an increase in real balances, all of which must he saved, gives rise to smaller saving in the form of physical capital. In Tohin's portfolio-balance model, real money balances and physical capital are substitutes. A higher anticipated rate of inflation induces individuals to economize on their holdings of money balances, freeing up savings for capital accumulation, This leads to a higher steady-state capital/lahor ratio, resulting in higher consuenprion per person so long as the steady state is nor pushed beyond the point where consumption per person is maximized (the so-called Golden Rule point).
The Tohin effect, that higher inflation induces higher levels of capital, output and consumption per worker, is open to a number of objections. For one thing, it is dependent on Tohin's assumption that savings are a constant proportion of inconme. If the savings rate is directly reduced by higher inflation, the Tohin effect can be reversed-even in the framework of Tohin's model (Dornbusch and Frenkel, 1973) , Moreover, the Tohin effect is model-specific. The effect is absent in Ramsey-type models, in which the marginal product of capital is tied to the representative agent's rate of time preference. In such models, the marginal product of capital defines a unique steady-state capital\labor ratio which is independent of the level of real money balances, It is now generally recognized that the results of both Tohin-and Ramsey-type models are sensitive to small changes in assumptions. Moreover', Orphanides and Solon ' (1990) show that different anodels or small changes in assumnptions in a particular enodel deliver disparate conclusions about the Tobin effect. Consequently, it is impossible as a matter of pure theory to make a conmpelling case that inflation increases real output.
A crucial reason for the fragility of these results is that, by their very nature, these money-growth models are the wrong vehicles for analyzing the role of money in the economy and, hence, the effect of inflation on the economy A striking examnple of this is provided by Tobin's model, which predicts that the highest level of output per person occurs in a barter economy in \vhich holdings of real money balances are nil. This result stems from not taking money seriously Real money balances reduce transaction costs. They do this by overcoming the dou-
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ble coincidence of wants associated with barter and by conveying information (for example, Brunner and Meltzer, 1971 ). Compared to a barter economy the reduction in total transaction costs permits society to devote more of its scarce resources to production, raising output and the consumption of goods and leisure. By reducing marginal transaction costs, money also results in a higher level of trade and correspondingly higher levels of output. Although the development of Solow-type growth models was an important first step in the analysis of growing economies, it is not surprising that these onecommodity models fail to capture the important role that money plays in real-world economies.
Thus far, we have contrasted money and non-monetary barter economies. In principle, similar effects occur when individuals are induced by a rise in anticipated inflation to reduce their holdings of real balances. If inflation induces individuals to hold fewer real balances, even if one were to accept Tobin's argument that inflation increases output per person, any increase would be at the expense of a loss to society of the services of real balances. In fact, if money enters the production function, the Tobin effect may well he reversed; inflation then reduces output per person, as in Srockman (1981) .
Inflation may nor only reduce the steadystare level of per capita output, it may reduce the growth rate of output itself, For if capital is appropriately defined more broadly to include human capital, as is done in recent endogenous-growrh models, inflation reduces investment in human capital, as well as in physical capital. Reduced investment in human capital lowers the growth of efficiency per person, which reduces the growth rate itself (for example, Lucas, 1988; King and Rebelo. 1990; and Dotsey and Ireland, 1993) . A small hut permanent reduction in the growth rate due to inflation has an adverse effect on output levels, This continual effect on output levels is more significant than any effect of inflation on the one-time altering of the level of output per capita explored in earlier exogenous-growth models.
Once we leave purely theoretical-growth models, and look at real-world economies, we must deal with how inflation interacts with real-world institutions, Ir has been shown that the interaction of inflation with a less-than-fully indexed tax system works to discourage capital accumulation (Feldstein, 1976 (Feldstein, , 1979 and Tatom, 1976) .
The bottom line is that even within the framework of theoretical-growth models, the Tobin effect is subject to small changes in assumptions. When real-world insrimntions are included in the analysis, the weight of evidence is that inflation discourages capital accumulation. The Tobin effect is reversed.°W hen capital is defined more realistically to. include human capital, the effect of inflation is to continually reduce the levels of output per person below what they would have been under stable prices.
Does Moderate Inflation Enhance Relative Real-V-/age Adjustments?
The third argument for moderate inflation (Tobin, 1972; Schultze, 1985; Lucas, 1989; DeLong and Summers, 1992; and Summers, 1991) asserts that declines in the price of commodities and in the real wage of workers specialized to a particular industry can be made with less friction in a world with moderate inflation than in a world of stable prices. It is argued that under moderate inflation, the decline in a product's price and in the real wage rare of workers can be accomplished through a rise in prices and money wages elsewhere.
The belief that inter-industry adjustmnenms are smoother under a regime of moderate inflation rests on the view that laborers prefer a rise in the prices of wage goods to an absolute reduction in money wages. But why should this he the case? Workers experience an identical decline in real wages in homlm cases.
One answer depends on the existence of a money illusion: A decline in real wages brought about by a rise in the prices of wage goods is incorrectly perceived as smaller than the same decline in the real wage that occurs throttgh a reduction in money wages. dence (i\ cLaughlin, 1994; and Lebow, Stockton and Wascher, 1993) suggests there is no dearth of nominal wage curs, even during periods of moderate inflation.
Furthermore, firms in a declining industry may adjust workers' compensation without cutting wages. Compensation includes benefits and perks which can be adjusted relatively easily relative to wages in cases in which workers have an irrational fear of nominal wage curs. In any event, we believe that for the resistance to nominal wage cuts to be widespread, it must he motivated by considerations deeper than a pure money illusion.
One possible rationale for such resisrance is that workers feel they have some control over money wages but no control over the general price level. Consequently the same reduction in the real wage rate due to reduction in money wages brings into play factors that workers believe they can negotiate, in contrast to an increase in the prices of wage goods, which they are powerless to affect.
The second possible motivation would interact with the first, Workers may have less knowledge of demand rhan do employers. Consequently when the industry demand declines, workers nmay be concerned that the employer is misrepresenting the true state of nature to force an unnecessary reduction in money wages. In this case, a fall in the real wage rate due to a rise in the prices of wage goods elsewhere avoids triggering a signal-extraction problem.
We have endeavored to make the best possible case for moderate inflation as a device for smoothing inter-industry wage adjustments, hut in doing so, we have ignored the existence of a cushion on money wage declines even in a regime of stable prices. If we were to introduce technical progress, even under price stability the average level of money wages would rise at a rate equal to the average increase in output per person. This provides a cushion mitigating the need for an absolute decline in the money wage.
Finally we suggesr the hypothesis that workers' resistance to nomninal wage cuts is not independent 0 f the inflation regime in which they live. Under stable prices, such cuts may become more frequent and workers will become more accustomed to and less distrustful of money wage cuts. Accordingly any "lubricant" that moderare inflation may provide to ease labor market frictions will become increasingly unnecessany in a zeroinflation regime. Although the claim that moderate inflation facilitates inter-industry wage adjustments cannot be definitively rejected, it does not rest on compelling theoretical or empirical foundations, In any event, monetary policy is an inappropriate and ineffective instrument for dealing with labor marker problems, such as market frictions or the suboprimaliry of the natural unemployment rate. The latter may be due to taxes on wages which make the after-tax real wage smaller than the before-rax marginal product of labor. The socially optimal amount of employment equates the disutility of labor to the before-tax real wage so that after-tax employment is sub-optimal. Moreover, high unemployment compensation increases time spent in "search unemployment." The drift to higher unemployment in Europe and Canada is unlikely to reflect a movement up a short-run Phillips curve produced by unanticipated deflation, but rather is due to an upward drift in the natural rate of unemployment. In this case, appropriate policies to reduce unemployment are reforms in taxes and unemployment compensation, nor monetary policy
Moderate Infiaticyn Enhances the Cauntei-cyclical Iifhccxy at Monetary Policy
A fourth argument for moderate steadystare inflation is that it enhances the counter cyclical efficacy of monetary policy by enabling the Federal Reserve to make the real rare of interest negative. The argument that the efficacy of monetary policy is enhanced by a onoderate rate of steady-state inflation stems from the recognition that the money rate can never he negative, so that in a non-inflationary environment, in which the real and money rates are equal, the best that monetary policy can do is to drive both the D[~IFW JULY/AUGUST 1995 real and nominal rates of inrerest to zero, 4
DeLong and Summers (1992) and Summers (1991) argue rhar in a zero inflation regime, monetary policy will be unable to produce a sufficiently large reduction in the real interest rate to restore full employment in times of large adverse shocks to aggregate demand. Is this an important argument for moderate inflation? There are several reasons to think not, First, the argument is based on the belief that the monetary authority can exert considerable influence over real interest rates rhrough the so-called liquidity effect, and that monetaey policy works primarily if nor solely through its ability to influence the real interest rate. According to this view, an expansionary monetary policy drives real interest rates down, inducing an increase in spending. But the extent and duration of the effect of monetary policy on short-term real interest rates is controversial, theoretically and empirically The exchange between Ohanian and Stockman (1995) and Hoover (1995) highlights the difficulties with theoretical models of the liquidity effect, The empirical evidence on the liquidity effect is mixed. Work by Reichensrein (1987) , Thornton (1988) , Gordon and Leeper (1994) and Pagan and Robertson (1995) suggests the liquidity effect is relatively weak and short-lived, although research by Chrisriano and Eichenhaum (1991,1992) , Cook and Hahn (1989) and Romer and Romer (1990) suggest a more significant effect of monetary policy on real short-term interest rates.
Second, it is difficult to argue that sufficient investment opportunities will nor exist unless the real rate is negative. The issue is whether the economic outlook can become sufficiently pessimistic that the expected real return on longer-term investments is negative. That DeLong and Summers (1992) and Summers (1991) have raised it again suggests that this old debare is far from settled. Bailey (1971) argues that there will always he some investments that yield a snmall nonnegative return, even if a depressed economy were not expected to return to its steadystate growth path for a period of 10 to 20 years. If investment opportunities increase sufficiently ar very low but positive interest rates, the efficacy of monetary policy is nor impaired by a zero lower bound on the real interest rare. Bailey's argument suggests that credit demand becomes very large (essentially infinite) at very low real interest rates, so that the real longer-term interest rates do not have to be negative to significantly increase investment.
Finally despite the etnpirical evidence to the contrary there appears to he a fairly widespread belief that the Federal Reserve exerts considerable influence over real shortterm interest rates, hum much less influence over longer-term interest rates (see, for example, Goodfriend, 1993; and Greenspan, 1993) . If monetary policy cannot make the long-term rate negative, it is natural to ask: Is rhere any gain from the possibility that the Federal Reserve may he able to make shortterm interest rates negative for temporary periods? In markets in which there are few impediments to the flow of funds between the long and short end of the market, consistency of expectations requires that the current long-term interest rate be equal to the expected average of future short-term rates plus a risk premium. The risk premium is affected by a number of things, including uncertainty about future short-term interest rates.
If the market believes that the policy does nor signal an increase irm policymakers' desired steady-state inflation rates, people know that today's policy must give rise to reversals later. Whether the difference in the magnitude of the decline and subsequent rise in short-term interest rates in the zero and moderate inflation regimes will result in significantly different paths for real long-term interest rates under the two reginmes is impossible to determine, a priori. Indeed, it is as easy to conjecture scenarios in which there would he no difference in the response of long-term real interest rates under the two steady-state inflation regimes as it is to conjecture scenarios in which there would he a significanr difference. ' Given that it is unlikely that moderare inflation will enable the Federal Reserve to have a significantly larger effect on long-term real interest rates, and that very low or zero No one mom 11 willingly tmde a dollar fer, soy, 95 teats a year Item tom, so long os tie some butt could be ieid fit t year at zero tarryiag cost.
'Indeed, Folntet mad ltodigen 11993) simmlote the effect of more oggmessite policies tlet teselt it negative slorttetm interest totes mmd find vety smell cltenges i n Ieeg'tetm motes.
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HFYIFJ ULY/AUGUST 5905 real interest rates are likely to be sufficient for the Fed to offset adverse aggregate demand shocks, the argument that moderate inflation enhances the efficacy of monetary policy seems doubtful. If some role for inflation uncertainty is factored in, the idea that moderate inflation enhances the efficacy of monetary policy becomes even more tenuous.
Why Zero inflation Is Preferable
Although mnany estimate the output losses of moderate inflation to be modest, this issue is far from settled. In addition to the usual problems of measuring the permanent output losses, Dorsey and Ireland (1993) have shown that in a general-equilibrium analysis, the usual effects of inflation (the inefficient economizing on real money balances, substituting market activity for leisure, and redirecting resources from goods production to financial activities) compound to produce a significant output loss. Dorsey and Ireland's result stems in part from the fact that inflation lowers real output growth. Although the effects on output growth appear small, compounded over time, they are significant. Another compelling reason to prefer zero inflation is that higher inflation is associated with increased variability of both inflation and relative prices. The increased variability of inflation and consequent inflation uncertainty shorten contract lengths, thereby increasing contract costs. The greater variability also contaminates price signals, so the price system conveys less information. As the variability of inflation (associated with higher inflation) increases, it becomes more difficult to determine whether a particular commodiry price change reflects a movement in the general price level, or a real shIft in supply or demand resulting from taste and productivity shocks.
In addition, inflation and the higher variability of the general price level cause a reallocation of resources from the production of goods to financial services for the sole purpose of hedging against inflation. Even if there is no reduction in conventional measures of oumpur, inflation produces a distornon of output. The banking system and financial service industries expand relative to other employment of resources such as industrial output, and households sacrifice leisure to reduce their real balances when the inflation tax rises. These effects call into question the notion than, by penalizing the consumption of priced commodities, inflation reduces work effort and increases leisure.
Although it is difficult to quantify the degree to which inflation impairs the ability of the price system to signal correct information, there is no doubt that the price system allocates resources most efficiently in the absence of inflation.
Moreover, zero inflation is preferable to moderate inflation because inflation, even moderate inflation, distorts accounting, legal contracts and the tax system. Inflation also distorts the true cost of inventories, the depreciation of plant and equipment, as well as the rime profile of real mortgage payments, and other fixed-dollar denominated contracts.
Of course, this analysis assumes that taxes and private contracts are not indexed against inflation. Why in may be asked, don't the authorities index taxes against changes in the price level so that real payments are unaffected? Why in turn, doesn't the private sector index wages and financial contracts to nullify the impact of price changes?
In fact, the tax code is now partly indexed against inflation, Indexanion, however, is often taken as a signal that the authorities are giving up the battle against inflation, This was the basis for the outspoken opposition to indexarion by former Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur Burns and why the Bank of Canada has opposed indexanon, It is easy to construct examples in which inflation-mitigating schemes, such as indexanion by reducing the marginal costs of inflation, lead to an increase in the aggregate inflation rate, Moreover, foregoing indexanon may he a help in developing a reputation for credibly pursuing anri-inllation policies (see, for example, Fischer and Summers, 1989) . For these reasons, it is not clear that indexanion of tax codes is desirable.
In the private sector, indexarion is unlikely to occur. At the hearr of the diffi-culty is a coordination problem. To be successful, indexanion must be implemented by a large number of diverse firms facing different informnation, For example, are price changes due no nominal or real variables? Iris wellknown that indexing money wages to changes in prices due no real shocks is undesirable,°A re price changes permanent or transitory? Are the price changes industry-specific or global? It is unlikely that individuals will agree on the cause of a price change and then coordinate their actions. Given these obstacles, indexation in the private sector is difficult and, hence, fairly rare. Moreover, in instances in which private indexanion is fairly widespread, as in Israel, in reduces the resolve to fight escalating inflation.
Finally in is imnpossihle to fully index real cash balances against inflation, as previously discussed, because inflation leads people to hold fewer cash balances and results in a loss of their services,' For these reasons, indexation is a frail reed on which to rest hopes of mitigating inflation's effects,
Price Stability as the Objective of Manetary Polk,v
Reducing an established moderate inflation trend may disrupt economic activity producing temporary output and employment losses. Given an established moderate inflation rate, Howitt (1990, p. 104) argues than despite the desirability of zero inflation, the cost of achieving in probably outweighs the benefits. This arguenenc against moving to price stability ignores the inflationary bias (amid resulting uncertainty) that characterizes policy regimes motivated by concerns for transitional output and employment losses.
In the absence of a commitment to stable prices, a central hank concerned about transitional unemployment is likely to respond asymmetrically to shocks-temporary or permanent. This asymmetric behavior has clear implications for the price level in the case of demand shocks, A mnonenary authority concerned with transitional unenmployment will he less willitmg no offset a demand shock that raises prices and employnmenr than no offset an adverse demand shock than lowers prices and employment. This asymmetric behavior extends to supply shocks as well,~Adverse shocks will he accommodated; favorable ones will be ignored. Although the price level depends on many factors, including the relative incidence of positive and negative shocks, concern for transitional unemployment leads a central hank no pursue policies that will cause the price level to he higher than it would be otherwise.
This asymmetric behavior creates an inflationary bias with the potential for accelerating inflation, As inflation increases, the monetary authority may be forced to tolerate transitional unemployment to hring the inflation down. Indeed, this appears no be what happened in the United States in the late 1 9 70s and on a smaller scale in the late 1980s, The best way to avoid such disruptions is to coonmir to a policy of stable prices.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
We have reviewed several argunments in favor of moderate inflation and we find them to be lacking theoretically and, in some instances, empirically The first arguenent, that nmoderane inflation enhances economic stability, is subject no compelling objections. If expectations are adaptive, any decline in the semi-elasticity of money demand associated with a higher inflation may well be offset by a more rapid revision of inflationary expectations. If expectations are rational, this must be the case.
The argument than inflation leads no a higher level of output is based on theoretical models that are non robust to small specification changes. When real-world institutions are taken into account, the weight of the evidence is that inflation discourages capital accumulation. When capital is defined to include huonan capital, inflation may reduce not only the level of output per capita hut ins rare of grosvnh as well.
Also suspect is the proposition that moderate inflation increases the efficacy of mnonetary policy by allowing the central hank no make the real rare of interest negative. Sufficient investment opportunities are likely no exist at very low' but positive real tie antlettes i n l smael irdeoed money wages to a price index wfrici included imported goods. In fact, imported goods should iv excluded since cionges i n import prices reflect ciaoges i m a reel tori able, the terms of trede. later on, RE mistoke was mctied eel terms of trade effects mere eucluded from the pi cc index.
I r a principle, to maoimize tic services of meal Ideates, t mould In desiraile to lone prices fell at the reoi rate of interust ond set the money rate of interest to zero. People mould tiun be induced to hold the sotiety queetry of reel idences. It would teke us too for ofield, homeren to discuss the rarerits of defiaton utthe reel note i n comparison with stoile prices. Iherefore, me confine out attenter to a compoisan of zero witi moderate inflation.
In the case of the oi l sled i n thu 1 970s lee adomse supply siock which tunded to raise infiotiorm and reduce autpttl, a numier of ucone mists advocated e tunmtum increase i n the stock of muney to offset a potnotiel iocreosn it uten ploymunt. On tie otier land, luom meey names ' mere raised i n fonor of o redoctoo i n tie money stock mien OPFC coiopsed? 
